Competition among countries-or regions within them-to attract mobile capital is often thought to discipline their governments, motivating them to invest more in infrastructure, reduce waste and corruption, and spend less on non-productive public goods. The result should be convergence on business-friendly policies. We argue that this requires an assumption-units start out very similar-that is often unrealistic. If units are heterogeneous (in natural resources, geographical location, inherited human capital or infrastructure), capital mobility often weakens discipline on the poorlyendowed units. This may help explain disappointing results of liberalizing capital flows within Russia and sub-Saharan Africa. (JEL F36, H73, H87) 
the liberalization of capital flows between them. Capital controls are defended by some as vital to preserve national (or regional) policy autonomy, and attacked by others as shelters for inefficient or corrupt governments. 3 In this paper, we argue that the discipline effect invoked by both schools is not as general as usually thought. The standard model that justifies it relies on a strong assumption that is unlikely to hold for most real world cases. Critically, schola rs assume that regions or countries (henceforth, "units") are identical. They then focus only on symmetric equilibria, in which by definition units converge on the same policies or tax rates. We show that given alternative, empirically plausible assumptions, almost exactly opposite conclusions follow.
If some units start out better endowed than others with characteristics that make them attractive to investors (e.g., natural resources, geographical advantages, inherited human capital), symmetric equilibria will not exist. If differences in endowments are sufficiently large, the worse-endowed units will actually have less business-friendly policies in equilibrium under capital mobility than if they had effective capital controls. Rather than being disciplined, officials of such units will spend a larger share of the budget on non-productive public goods or on their own consumption than when capital is immobile. By contrast, better-endowed units will invest more in business services and will suck capital out of their poorlyendowed counterparts. The result will be not convergence but polarization of both policies and government quality.
To put it concretely, even if Chad's government were to invest massively in business infrastructure, it would not be able to attract much money out of the capital markets of New York or compete in productivity with the industrial zones of East Asia. Even if the Russian republic of Buryatia were to install high-speed fibre-optic cables, it would not divert much business from Moscow and St Petersburg. Under capital immobility, governments have some incentive to increase the productivity with which local savings are invested-they will be able to tax the profits. Under capital mobility, domestic savings will flee the unit's undeveloped infrastructure and political risk in search of more secure returns.
Knowing they cannot compete, governments in poorly-endowed units will give up on pro-business policies and focus instead on either predation or satisfying the demands of local citizens. They will face less, not more, effective discipline.
We demonstrate this point using a simple model of competition for capital among heterogeneous units, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production technology. In Cai and Treisman (2003) , we show that the findings hold also in a more general model. The results help make sense of some otherwise surprising empirical cases. Internal capital flows have been liberalized recently in both China and Russia. While competition among the more developed coastal provinces and cities of China is impressive, there is little evidence of any salutary effect of competition on the inland provinces. 4 In Russia since reforms began, capital appears to have flowed out of poorly-endowed regions into a few well-endowed ones, exacerbating interregional inequality. Many developing countries liberalized their capital accounts in the 1980s and 1990s. Some-usually the upper middle -income ones-attracted large inflows of capital, stimulating growth. However, others-in particular, some Sub-Saharan African countries-suffered net capital outflows. During these decades, there was no noticeable, general improvement in the quality of African governance, and the continent continued to fall further behind the rest of the world in infrastructure and output.
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Our argument is related to several others. Students of economic growth noticed some time ago that countries' incomes were not converging in the way that simple neoclassical models predicted (Romer 1994, Barro and Sala -i-Martin 1995) . Common explanations posit that capital is more productive when combined with high levels of human capital, infrastructure, or property rights protection (Lucas 1990, 4 For instance, Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996) found the coastal provinces began diverging in output from the less developed inland provinces in the 1990s after international trade and investment flows were liberalized. 5 Another implication of our analysis is that among the better-endowed countries, those initially most attractive to foreign investors will prioritize infrastructure over non-productive public services the most. Although the parallel to our model is not exact (since we assume that all "well-endowed" units are alike), it is striking that among industrial democracies the most vigorous campaigns to roll back the welfare state came in the two countries already most attractive to investors-the USA (since the 1980s) and the UK (under Thatcher) (see, e.g., Piven 2001). Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992) . To our knowledge, no one has noted that such differences in endowments also undermine the claim that capital mobility disciplines governments.
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In a recent essay, Rogowski (2003) makes an argument similar to ours. He uses a spatial model of policy preferences to explore the extent to which the median voter (worker) will favor policies that accommodate mobile capital. He finds that for some kinds of initial asymmetry, the two countries' policies diverge further under capital mobility than under immobility. 7 Our paper differs in several ways.
First, when setting policy, Rogowski's median voter does not explicitly consider the effect his policy choice will have on subsequent capital flows. 8 Such effects are central to our analysis. Second, Rogowski models a tradeoff between voters' exogenous-perhaps ideological-preferences on policy and the impact of policy on their wages, leaving the public sector budget in the background. We model the tradeoff between a policy's fiscal costs and benefits. Thus, Rogowski's analysis lends itself most naturally to topics such as environmental or labor regulations, where policies do not have direct tax costs and where voters' ideological preferences may conflict with their self-interest. It applies less well to questions of public investment, law enforcement, and governance, on which we focus.
Several previous papers analyzed asymmetric tax competition. Bucovetsky (1991) presented a model in which smaller countries have lower equilibrium tax rates because the benefit from capital has a larger per capita impact than in larger countries. Wilson (1991) also examined asymmetric tax competition, in a quite general setting. Kanbur and Keen (1993) , in a model with commodity taxes and transportation costs, found that governments of geographically small countries should set the tax rate 6 The ineffectiveness of such uneven competition to motivate players echoes a result of the literature on tournaments (e.g. Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983) . We thank a referee for pointing out this parallel.
7 However, for another kind of asymmetry-in the initial capital/labor ratio-he finds policy convergence. etc.), education, public health, and a system of well-enforced property rights and legal protections. 9 The productivity of capital in a unit depends on both its exogenous endowments and its government's infrastructure investment.
To fix ideas, suppose that the aggregate production function of unit i, To complete the model, we must assume something about the objectives of government. Suppose that governments are partially self -interested, caring about private consumption, government spending, or some combination of the two. 10 In the simplest case, let government i G have the payoff function:
( 1) iiii UtFc λ =−+ where i t is the tax rate on output, c i is government spending, and 0 λ ≥ measures the government's preference for public spending relative to private consumption (assumed to be the same across units).
Government consumption, c i , can be interpreted in either of two ways: as incumbent officials' consumption of budget funds or as spending on public goods and services demanded by citizens.
Equation (2) thus encompasses the extreme cases of pure benevolence (in which case c i stands for public good provision, and (2) is equivalent to the payoff function for a representative citizen) and of purely predatory government (in which case c i represents government consumption and λ approaches infinity.)
Each government is endowed with initial fiscal revenue S ≥ 0 . To present the main ideas in the most direct way, we first assume tax rates in all units are exogenously fixed at the same level:
, and later discuss how things change when this assumption is relaxed. The budget constraint of government G i is iii IcStF +=+ .
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We study a game in which all governments simultaneously decide how much to invest in infrastructure. Then investors invest their capital. We compare two polar cases: (1) capital is completely immobile and the allocation is fixed at some historically determined level; and (2) capital is perfectly mobile and can cross borders costlessly. Of course, reality lies somewhere in between, but the comparison suggests what is likely to happen as capital becomes more mobile.
10 For a similar approach, see Edwards and Keen (1996) .
11 Cai and Treisman (2003) 
B. Capital mobility
Now suppose capital is perfectly mobile across units. Given this, capital will flow from units with lower after-tax marginal rates of return to capital to units with higher rates. In an interior equilibrium in which all units have positive capital, the rates in all units must be equalized. Let r be the economy-wide net return to capital. We suppose for now that each unit is small relative to the whole economy (both and NM are large), so each takes r as given and ignores potential effects of its decisions on r. In Section II, we argue that our results are likely to hold even more strongly if units compete directly and anticipate the effect of their infrastructure investments on r.
If government i G makes infrastructure investment i I , the capital inflow to i is given by (5) (1)
From (5) and (1), we see that:
Clearly, capital flows into units that invest more in infrastructure. In addition, capital inflow to i is lower, the higher is the economy-wide net return to capital, r, because higher r means other units are making la rger infrastructure investments.
Given r, i G chooses i I to maximize its payoff, (1)(,)
iiiii UtFkIc λ =−+ , subject to its budget constraint and the capital allocation rule , (6). Substituting its budget constraint into its objective function, we obtain the first order condition:
Equation (7) has the usual interpretation for optimality: the marginal benefit of infrastructure investment on the left-hand side must equal its marginal cost on the right-hand side. Comparing this with the first order condition for the case of capital immobility, Equation (3), there is an additional term, iiii FkkI ∂∂∂∂ , on the benefit side, which represents the indirect effect of infrastructure investment i I on unit i's output due to the additional capital it attracts to the unit.
Previous papers have pointed to this infrastructure-and output-increasing effect of capital competition to argue that fiscal decentralization and the liberalization of capital controls can discipline governments and increase welfare (see, e.g., Qian and Roland, 1998 ). An unnoticed, yet critical, assumption for that conclusion is that the capital allocation under capital mobility is the same as that under capital immobility. 12 Given this, / ii FI ∂∂ is unchanged, and so the left-hand side of (7) is unambiguously greater than the left-hand side of (3). However, if a unit's capital allocation under mobility is lower than under immobility, there will be a second offsetting effect. Because capital and infrastructure are complements, a lower capital allocation reduces the unit's incentive to invest in infrastructure:
/ ii FI ∂∂ will be lower under mobility. For such units, the total effect will be ambiguousthe left-hand side of (7) might be either greater or smaller than that of (3). Previous papers avoid this by assuming identical units and focusing on symmetric equilibria so that the capital allocation is the same under mobility and immobility. However, as we show below, when units have different endowments, no symmetric equilibrium exists and capital allocation must be different in the two cases. Under mobility, as initial asymmetry increases, the capital allocation becomes more and more uneven.
Given the Cobb-Douglas technology and (5), Equation (7) can be solved for (;)
iii IkA: −> ). This is the well-known competition effect. However, since capital allocation is endogenous, this conclusion may be overturned. 12 We thank a referee for pointing this out and suggesting the intuition below. Equations (9), (10) From Equations (9) and (10), we can write: 
II. Extensions and robustness
How general is the point sketched above? In a longer version of the paper, we show the conclusion is robust to a number of variations. First, one might wonder whether the result holds for output functions other than the Cobb-Douglas one in (1). In Cai and Treisman (2003) , we derive the same qualitative results using a general, increasing and concave output function (,;) iiii FfkIA =
. We make the standard assumption that capital, infrastructure, and endowments are complementary, and a couple of additional regularity assumptions to ensure that units do not become too quickly satiated in capital. In this general case, we show that under capital mobility, the poorly endowed units invest less in infrastructure as the endowment gap widens; for sufficiently high endowment asymmetry, they build less infrastructure than under capital immobility. When the production function does not satisfy Inada conditions and the initial asymmetry is high, the interior equilibrium may disappear, yielding instead an equilibrium of total polarization in which the infrastructure investment and capital of the poorly-endowed units go to zero. 14 13 It is the lifting of restrictions on outflows from poorly endowed units that blunts the incentives for their governments, rather than the lifting of restrictions on inflows. However, inflows are likely to be meager if outflows are heavily restricted. Both Downsian spatial models and "citizen-candidate" models (Osborne and Slivinski 1996, Besley and Coate 1997) assume that the policy chosen is that most preferred by one of the voters. In the Downsian setup, the median voter dictates policy, assuming a Condorcet winner exists. 15 In "citizen-candidate" models, the winning candidate chooses his favorite policy. If we assume citizen preferences are linear in after-tax income and concave in public spending, we arrive in either case at a version of (12).
Retrospective voting models (Barro 1973 , Ferejohn 1986 Intuitively, these two effects make the conclusions of this paper even more likely to hold, because the first reduces the "competition effect" while the second strengthens the "polarization effect". In a model with 16 Suppose voters coordinate to vote the incumbent out of office if after-tax income falls below a threshold, k, but there is some stochastic element, ε , so that the incumbent is reelected only if (1) tFkε −≥+. Suppose, in addition, that ε is uniformly distributed, with density φ . Then the incumbent's probability of reelection,
ptFktFk εφ =≤−−=+−− , increases linearly in (1) tF − . 17 The formulations in both (2) and (12) ignore the complication that under capital mobility owners of investments may live outside the unit. Thus after-tax output in i may not correspond exactly to consumption of citizens of i. An alternative simplification would be to replace F i in (2) or (12) (1)(,)
iii LfkI α ≡− . The tax would then be a tax on just labor income, with labor assumed immobile. Roland (1998, p.1148 ) take this approach. It seems reasonable to assume L i would increase concavely in both I i and k i . In any case, if government i's payoff function is not concave in I i and k i there will be no competition for capital: the only equilibria under mobility will be corner solutions in which all capital flows to one unit. Our argument will hold even more strongly.
only one well-endowed and one poorly-endowed unit and with quadratic production functions, we fully characterize the strategic equilibr ium and show that our main results of this paper still hold.
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Finally, incorporating endogenous tax rate competition is also likely to strengthen the results. In this case, governments have two instruments to compete for mobile capital. Investing in infrastructure becomes more costly than before because the higher tax rates necessary to finance it discourage investors.
It is easy to see the logic in a model in which governments set both the local tax rate and infrastructure investment to maximize Equation (12). 19 The first order conditions for capital immobility are:
while those for mobility simplify to:
∂∂∂−∂∂∂∂ +=− ∂∂∂
We see the familiar "competition effect" in the second term on the left-hand side of (7'). This, as before, increases the marginal benefit of building infrastructure under mobility. But the marginal cost of infrastructure is also increased by the second term on the right-hand side, (1)(/)(/)/ iiiiii tFkktF −−∂∂∂∂ , which is always positive since ii kt ∂∂ will be negative. This term measures the loss in after-tax income caused by the higher tax rate s that are needed to finance additional infrastructure and by the outflow of capital such tax increases induce. Thus, equilibrium infrastructure investments will be lower than if the tax rate were exogenously fixed. The disciplining effect of capital mobility will be weaker. In the longer version of our paper, we prove that our main results extend to the case with endogenous tax competition. 18 In a fully strategic model, technical complications arise in characterizing the best response functions that involve higher order derivatives of the production functions. Assuming quadratic production functions circumvents those complications and hence allows clean results. The main insights, however, should be valid in general. See our longer version of the paper for details. 19 Maximizing (1) iii UtFc λ =−+ subject to iii cStFI =+− yields only corner solutions if 1 λ ≠ .
III. Illustrations
The logic we outline may help to explain several stylized facts about capital flows and government policies that are hard to reconcile with the standard thinking. There are certainly other explanations for these, so we mean the following discussion to be no more than suggestive.
A. Interregional capital flows in post-communist Russia
In Russia, the transition from communism after 1991 liberated private capital to flow relatively freely among the federation's 89 regions. A network of investment banks sprang up to channel such flows.
Informed by the conventional view, one might have expected all regions to speed up economic reforms, build infrastructure, and cut back on corruption and waste to compete for this mobile capital. In fact, the evidence suggests more a polarization into well-and poorly-endowed groups, with the former competing actively while the latter largely gave up on attracting investors.
Russia's regions differed greatly as of the early 1990s. We constructed an index of their initial endowments, incorporating indicators of natural resources (raw materials production); geographical advantages (the negative distance from Berlin or Tokyo, whichever was closest); inherited human capital (average education level, number of R&D organization), and physical infrastructure (share of roads paved, number of public buses per capita). 20 We found that a region's initial endowments, as measured by this index, correlated positively with various indicators of regional government effort to build infrastructure or enact business-friendly policies in subsequent years.
For instance, in almost all regions the pace of construction of roads and water mains fell during the decade. However, construction tended to fall less in regions with better initial endowments. 21 That might reflect greater financial constraints on the poorly-endowed regions. But, better-endowed regions seem also to have allocated a larger share of their budgets to growth-promoting infrastructure. The average share of regional spending on "development of markets", transport, roads, communications, and information technology correlated positively with initial endowments (r = .48, p < .01). 22 Better endowed regions also moved faster to replace communist institutions with a market system.
The business magazine Ekspert publishes annual regional ratings of the "degree of development of the leading institutions of a market economy". Since no regions had market institutions at the start of transition, this, by definition, measures change since 1990. Regions with better initial endowments tended to rank higher on the Ekspert institutional rating as of 2001 (r = .41, p < .01; see Figure 1 ).
More business-friendly policies and institutions were associated with higher inflows of investment. Data to judge this are imperfect, but still permit some tentative conclusions. We calculated two measures of net capital inflows for 1998, the latest year for which we had data: (1) total investment in non-financial assets in the region minus total savings of its population, and (2) total bank credits issued in the region minus total savings. An excess of local investment or credit emission over local savings would suggest net capital inflows. We also examined rates of foreign investment. As shown in Table 1 , regions with more business-friendly policies tended to have higher rates of capital inflows by any of these measures. The correlation between business-friendly policies and capital inflows was positive and significant even controlling for our measure of initial endowments, consistent with the argument that the business-friendly policies themselves attracted capital, not just the endowments.
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In sum, patterns of regional policy and capital flows in Russia since market liberalization seem to fit the model of this paper better than they do the conventional wisdom. In regions with better initial endowments, governments tended to spend proportionally more on infrastructure, to cut back less on construction of roads and water mains, and to develop more effective market institutions. More businessfriendly policies correlated, in turn, with larger net inflows of both domestic and foreign capital. Major urban or industrial centers such as Moscow, St Petersburg, and Samara competed vigorously for capital, and got it. More remote, resource-poor, underdeveloped regions such as the Altai, Tyva, or Kalmyk
Republics did not bother to compete. They let their physical infrastructure run down, spent almost nothing on market development, and had among the lowest-rated market institutions. Each suffered net outflows of local savings.
[ Table 1 and Figure 1 about and 1995, electricity generating capacity and the number of telephone mainlines both grew more slowly in the average African country than in the rest of the world. 25 In short, capital account liberalization has not prompted a significant inflow of capital into the most underdeveloped countries. And there is little evidence competition for capital has led their governments to enact more business-friendly policies.
IV. Conclusions
The free flow of capital is viewed by many as a powerful disciplining force, pressuring governments to improve their business climate, reduce welfare programs, and cut waste and corruption. Although scholars differ over whether the benefits of such discipline outweigh the costs, few question that it exists. This view informs policy debates on the desirability of both political decentralization and the liberalization of international capital flows. 25 Calculated from database for Canning (1998) .
However, when regions or countries differ markedly in natural resources, human capital, or infrastructure, we showed that the disciplining effect is likely to be one-sided. Better-endowed units compete aggressively and drain capital from their poorly-endowed counterparts. Poorly-endowed units, knowing they will lose, simply give up. As a result, such units may be even less business-friendly when capital is mobile than when it is not.
Our argument does not necessarily imply endorsement of capital controls. There are well-known efficiency reasons for favoring free capital flows. However, it suggests more thinking may be in order about how to organize capital competition. Although we hesitate to draw policy conclusions from such a simple model, three ideas might be worth at least exploring. First, when endowment differences are not too large, external aid to finance market infrastructure, improve human capital, or insure against exogenous risks might reduce the initial productivity gap to the point at which the disciplining effect of competition kicks in. In decentralized states, centrally funded infrastructure investments might help poorly-endowed regions compete, motivating their governments to reform themselves. 26 Second, if the discipline of capital competition is considered desirable, it may make sense to liberalize capital flows first within clubs of countries (or regions) with similar endowments. Freeing up capital flows within the European Union or within a group of African states may benefit disadvantaged countries more than if all were to integrate directly into world capital markets. Third, there are many reasons why political decentralization might be favored. But if the goal is to impose discipline on local governments, our analysis suggests an important qualification. Decentralization may achieve this in homogeneous countries. However, within geographically diverse ones, decentralization may sometimes have the opposite effect. 26 The challenge, of course, is how to ensure that such central investments or international aid are spent on infrastructure rather than being diverted to other uses. To this, we do not have any simple answers. Goskomstat (1999 Goskomstat ( , 2000 , Ministry of Finance reports on regional budget execution, Ekspert magazine (www.ekspert.ru). a p < .10; all other correlations significant at p < .01. (5) number of public buses per 1,000 inhabitants as of 1992, minus the standardized value of the distance from the nearer of Berlin and Tokyo. Natural log of (1) taken because distribution highly skewed. Index of development of market institutions from Ekspert (www.ekspert.ru), adjusted so that "most developed" is 89, "least developed" is 1.
